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ABSTRACT
System monitoring tools have served to provide operators and de-
velopers with an insight into system execution and an understand-
ing of how the system behaves under previously untested scenar-
ios. Many system abnormalities leave a signature impact on the
system execution which may arise out of performance issues, bugs
or errors. Having the ability to quantify and search such behavior
in the system execution history can facilitate new ways of looking
at problems. For example, operators may use clustering to group
and visualize similar system behaviors together. In this work we
propose a monitoring infrastructure that extracts a new breed of
formal, indexable, low-level system signatures using the classical
vector space model from the field of information retrieval and text
mining. We drive an analogy between the representation of kernel
function invocations with terms within text documents. This par-
allel allows us to automatically index, store, and later retrieve and
compare the system signatures. As with information retrieval, the
key insight is that we need not rely on the semantic information in
a document. Instead, we consider only the statistical properties of
the terms belonging to the document (and to the corpus), which en-
ables us to provide an efficient way to extract signatures at runtime
and analyze the signatures using statistical formal methods. We
have built a prototype in Linux, Fmeter, which extracts low-level
system signatures by recording all kernel function invocations. We
show that the signatures are naturally amenable to formal process-
ing with statistical methods like clustering and supervised machine
learning.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.3.4 [Information Storage and Retrieval]: Systems and Soft-
ware—performance evaluation, question-answering (fact retrieval)
systems; I.2.6 [Artificial Intelligence]: Learning—concept learn-
ing, knowledge acquisition
General Terms
Algorithms, Design, Experimentation, Measurement, Performance
Keywords
information retrieval, term-frequency inverse document frequency,
indexable system signatures, counting kernel function calls
1. INTRODUCTION
System monitoring is key to understanding system behavior. De-
velopers and operators rely on system monitoring to provide in-
formation necessary to identify, isolate, and potentially fix perfor-
mance bottlenecks and hidden bugs. Unfortunately, as computer
systems become increasingly complex, understanding their execu-
tion behavior to identify such performance bottlenecks and hidden
bugs has become more difficult. Furthermore, large scale system
deployments, like the present-day datacenters that power cloud ser-
vices, require increasingly complex automatic system monitoring
infrastructures [23, 40, 13].
One issue is that existing monitoring solutions have not been
designed to enable the extraction of low-overhead, low-level, sys-
tem signatures that are sufficiently expressive to be used in auto-
matic analysis by formal methods. For example, instruction level
monitoring in software and breakpoint debugging incur prohibitive
overheads; system call tracing is both expensive and not expressive
enough; hardware counters by themselves provide little amounts of
specialized information while hardware counter assisted profiling
is not expressive enough since it relies on sampling. By contrast,
high-level metrics, like the number of completed transactions per
second are overly general and application specific, and are unable
to capture with sufficient fidelity low-level system behavior.
Another issue is that few monitoring solutions provide a system-
atic and formal way to leverage past diagnostics in future problem
detection and resolution [11]. Instead, system monitoring has tradi-
tionally been performed in an ad-hoc fashion, using anything from
printf/printk statements, debuggers, operating system pro-
cess tracers, runtime instrumentation [30], to logging libraries, ker-
nel execution tracing [2], low-level hardware counters [3, 5], gen-
eralized runtime statistics [12, 29], and system call monitoring [41]
to name a few.
In this paper we introduce Fmeter—a novel monitoring tech-
nique that efficiently extracts indexable low-level system descrip-
tions, or signatures, which accurately capture the state of a sys-
tem at a point in time. Every low-level signature is essentially a
feature vector where each feature roughly corresponds to the num-
ber of times a particular operating system’s kernel function was
invoked. Fmeter draws inspiration from the field of information
retrieval, which showed that counting words in a document is suffi-
ciently powerful to enable formal manipulations of document cor-
pora. Likewise, Fmeter does not rely on any additional contextual
information, like call stack traces, function parameters, memory
location accesses, and so on.
By construction, embedding kernel function calls into the vector
space model [38] yields formally indexable signatures of low-level
system behavior. Consequently, developers and operators can au-
tomatically analyze system behavior using conventional statistical
techniques such as clustering, machine learning / classification, and
similarity based search against a database of previously labeled sig-
natures. For example, Fmeter enables operators to instrument entire
datacenters of production-ready machines with the flip of a switch,
and provides a way to automatically diagnose problems. At the
very least, Fmeter enables the operators to prune out the space of
potential problems. By contrast, expending human expertise to per-
form forensic analysis in such an environment on a large number
of individual systems is intractable.
Fmeter occupies a new point in the design space of monitoring
systems that yield low-level system signatures. For example, un-
like low level statistical profilers (e.g. Oprofile [3]) which may
only capture the most frequent events in their event space, Fme-
ter records every single kernel function invocation, therefore there
are no events that fly under the radar—as long as they belong to
Fmeter’s event space to begin with. (Section 2.1 formally defines
what is the precise contribution of each kernel function invocation
count to a signature.) Moreover, Fmeter signatures are insensitive
to nondeterminism and are machine independent.
Since Fmeter does not need to collect any detailed contextual
information (like entire stack traces), generating and retrieving sig-
natures can be an efficient operation. As we demonstrate in Sec-
tion 4, we leverage this knowledge of the problem domain to render
the Fmeter prototype more efficient than the default Ftrace [2] ker-
nel function tracer. Like Ftrace, Fmeter has virtually zero runtime
overhead if it is not enabled. However, unlike the Ftrace function
tracer, Fmeter does not collect any additional semantic information
with each function call. The Fmeter runtime overhead introduced
by signature generation is sufficiently low that signature generation
can be turned on at production time for long continuous periods of
time. Generating and logging signatures over such long continuous
time intervals increases the likelihood of success of post-mortem
analysis of crashed systems.
Our contributions are as follows:
• We provide a novel method for extracting indexable low-
level system signatures by embedding kernel function calls
into the vector space model. The signatures are naturally
amenable for formal statistical manipulations, like cluster-
ing, machine learning / classification, and similarity based
search.
• We introduce Fmeter—an efficient prototype implementa-
tion of a monitoring system capable of generating and re-
trieving the low-level system signatures continuously over
long periods of time, in real-time, and with little overhead.
• We demonstrate that the signatures are sufficiently powerful
to capture meaningful low-level system behaviors which can
be accurately classified by conventional unsupervised and su-
pervised machine learning techniques. Furthermore, the sig-
natures are also sufficiently precise for automatic classifiers
to unambiguously distinguish even between system behav-
iors that differ in subtle ways.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 dis-
cusses our motivation, insight, approach, and challenges for cre-
ating an indexable signature via embedding kernel function calls
into a classical vector space model. We describe our Fmeter design
and implementation in 3. In Section 4, we evaluate Fmeter and our
proposed approach. We discuss limitations to our approach and de-
sign in Section 5. Finally, we discuss related work and conclude in
Sections 7 and 8 respectively.
2. METHODOLOGY
In our quest to efficiently extract meaningful low-level system
signatures that are formally indexable, we turned to the discipline
of information retrieval (IR) and text mining for inspiration. The
information retrieval community has had a long and proven track
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Figure 1: Kernel function call count during boot-up.
record of developing successful statistical techniques for automatic
document indexing and retrieval. In particular, the IR discipline has
shown that simple statistics computed over the document’s terms
are sufficiently powerful to yield information which can be for-
mally analyzed. For example, search engines typically throw away
semantic information (e.g. they do not parse sentences and para-
graphs) and use term frequencies mechanically for scoring and rank-
ing a document’s relevance given an input query.
Like the frequency of words in documents, function invocations
appear to follow a power-law like distribution. Figure 1 shows
invocation counts of 3815 functions of the Linux kernel version
2.6.28 invoked on a Dell Power Edge R710 four way quad core
x86 Nehalem platform from the late boot-up stage until the lo-
gin prompt was spawned. It shows that some functions are called
more frequently than others. This behavior is also consistent with
role of instruction-caches in exploiting temporal locality of code.
Such heavy-tailed distributions have been observed often in the
real-world. A classic example of such a power-law is the distri-
bution of wealth in the world, the distribution in rankings of U.S.
cities by population, and the distribution of document terms in a
large corpus of natural language [7]. For example, the word fre-
quency in the whole of Wikipedia [20], reported on November 27,
2006, follows a shape similar to that of Figure 1. Such distribu-
tions have been thoroughly analyzed by statisticians, economists,
computer scientists and mathematicians alike, and various analyti-
cal modes have been proposed. For example the power-laws can be
mathematically modeled by preferential attachment, also referred
to as the “rich get richer” effect.
2.1 Low-level System Signatures
Our key insight is that we extract low-level system signatures by
mapping the concepts of information retrieval and text mining to
system behavior. In our model, the information retrieval concept of
a “term” corresponds to a kernel function call, while the concept
of a “document” corresponds to a period of low-level system ac-
tivity, or function calls, over a predetermined period of time. (The
kernel function calls should not be confused with the system calls
exported by the kernel through it’s application binary interface.)
The “corpus” then corresponds to a collection of low-level system
activities. Like in the classical vector space model [38], we disre-
gard the semantic information in a document and consider only the
statistical properties of the terms belonging to the document (and to
the corpus). In our case, we disregard the sequence of kernel func-
tion calls (the “call stack” trace), the function parameters, memory
location accesses, or hardware device state manipulation. Instead,
we rely solely on counting the kernel function invocations, which
is significantly cheaper and introduces less overhead.
We use the term frequency-inverse document frequency (tf-
-idf) model to represent documents, and thus system signatures,
as weight vectors. The weight vector for a document j is vj =
[w1, j,w2, j, . . . ,wN, j]T where N is the number of “terms,” i.e. the
total number of kernel functions. Each weight wi, j = t fi, j × id fi,
or the product of the term frequency, and the inverse document fre-
quency. The term frequency is given by:
t fi, j =
ni, j
∑k nk, j
where ni, j is the number of times the term (function) i appears
(was called) in document (during the monitoring run) j. Essentially
the term frequency counts the number of times a term appears in
a document, and normalizes it by the size of the document. The
normalization step is required to prevent bias towards longer docu-
ments (or in our case towards longer runs) which would implicitly
have a higher term count by sheer virtue of their length (duration
of execution).
The inverse document frequency is used to diminish the weight
of terms that occur very frequently in the entire corpus, which is
the case for example with prepositions in text documents, or multi-
plexed functions like the ioctl, ipc and execve system calls,
or virtual memory management internal routines during the boot-
up phase (the top ranked kernel functions as seen in Figure 1). The
inverse document frequency is computed as:
id fi = log
|D|
|{d : ti ∈ d}|
where |D| is the size of the corpus, or in our case the number
of monitored low-level system activities, and the term |{d : ti ∈
d}| represents the number of documents containing the term ti (i.e.
∑ j ni, j).
Fmeter collects low-level system signatures, which are essen-
tially weight vectors vj (for each signature j), by counting the num-
ber of times each kernel function was called during a given time-
interval. More precisely, the set of distinct kernel functions induce
the orthonormal basis for the weight vectors vj. Each distinct ker-
nel function corresponds to one of the unit-vectors, i.e. versors, that
together span the space in which every system signature is defined
to be a point.
Since each signature is represented as a vector belonging to the
same vector space, we can express signature similarities as the sim-
ilarity between the vectors. One such measure is the cosine similar-
ity between two vectors—the cosine of the angle between the two
vectors:
cosθ =
x ·y
||x|| ||y||
where || · || is a vector norm and x ·y is the dot product between
the two vectors. Alternatively, one may specify a distance metric,
like the Minkowski distance induced by the Lp norm:
dp(x,y) = (∑
i
|xi− yi|p)
1
p .
Unless specified otherwise, throughout this paper we compare
vectors using the Euclidean distance, i.e. the distance metric in-
duced by the L2 norm. Furthermore, certain formal methods re-
quire we normalize the vectors, in which case we rely on the L2
norm as well.
Figure 2: Sketch vector representation in three dimensional
space, where the tf-idf scores of kernel functions f1, f2, and
f3 form the orthogonal basis.
Figure 2 shows a mock-up example with N = 3, where the do-
main (i.e. the orthonormal base) consists of three functions: f1, f2,
and f3 respectively. Vectors v1 and v2 are composed of tf-idf
scores computed over the functions f1, f2, and f3, over some period
of time. The figure also shows the geometric interpretation of the
cosine similarity—two vectors are identical if the angle θ between
them is 0 and the value of the cosθ = 1, and they are said to be
independent if the angle θ between them is pi2 and cosθ = 0.
In summary, Fmeter retrieves formal, indexable, low-level sys-
tem signatures by embedding kernel function invocations into the
classical vector space model [38]. Our approach was inspired by
the information retrieval / text mining literature. By broadly ig-
noring the semantics of the “documents,” we balance the delicate
act of constructing effective low-level signatures while at the same
time incurring low signature retrieval overhead, and in the process
we gained the opportunity to naturally manipulate signatures using
conventional statistical tools.
2.2 Statistical Data Analysis
The low-level system signatures collected by Fmeter are index-
able, hence they can be manipulated by formal data analysis meth-
ods like unsupervised and supervised machine learning, similarity
based search, and so on.
Clustering is one such unsupervised learning technique that groups
together vectors—and hence low-level system signatures—that are
naturally closer to each other, or similar, based on a given distance
metric. When used in conjunction with system signatures, cluster-
ing can identify similar low-level behaviors. A typical clustering al-
gorithm also returns the centroid of each grouping assignment. The
centroid of a cluster of signatures can then be used as a syndrome
which characterizes a manifestation of a common behavior, e.g. an
undesired behavior. Clustering can therefore be used to detect sys-
tem behaviors which are similar to past pathological behaviors or
previously encountered problems. A key property of clustering is
that it allows for unknown behaviors to be classified as similar to
some syndrome S, even though the unknown behaviors may belong
to a distinct class of their own (i.e. clustered together, the unknown
signatures yield a centroid which is closest to S). Section 4.2.2
contains our evaluation of Fmeter signature clustering.
Unlike unsupervised learning techniques like clustering, super-
vised learning depends on labeled training data to construct a pre-
dictive model. The model is subsequently used to make predictions
about unlabeled data. For example, if an operator had access to a
labeled training data set containing both signatures of the behav-
ior of a buggy / compromised device driver and signatures of the
normal behavior exercised by a correct device driver, future (unla-
beled) instances of buggy device driver behavior may be identified
by the classifier. Section 4.2.1 contains a detailed evaluation of ma-
chine learning using Fmeter signatures as training, validation, and
test data.
We envision an environment in which an operator has access to
a database of labeled low-level system signatures describing many
instances of normal and abnormal behavior, and perhaps the nec-
essary steps to remedy problems. The signatures are retrieved and
stored from systems whose behavior has been forensically identi-
fied and labeled. For example, signatures can be retrieved from
systems that operate within normal parameters, as well as from
systems that have been identified to exert certain bugs, performance
issues, and any unwanted behavior (like the system reacting to a de-
nial of service attack or a system being compromised and acting as
a spam-bot and so on). Once the root cause of the problem is found
for some abnormal behavior, Fmeter can then be used to generate
a large number of tf-idf signatures with low overhead. These
signatures are subsequently labeled appropriately, and stored in the
database for future training references by classifiers. Likewise, sig-
natures can be clustered to obtain syndrome centroids. By labeling
similar vectors and syndrome centroids with semantic meaning, an
operator may later determine automatically whether a system has
some property or is behaving in an undesired fashion.
Interestingly, clustering may also be applied recursively. By ap-
plying meta-clustering on the retrieved cluster centroids, we can
determine which entire classes, not just individual signatures of
behaviors, are similar to one another. If two classes of system
behaviors are similar with respect to their tf-idf signatures, it
means they are similar in the way they invoke the kernel’s func-
tions. We can therefore schedule concurrently executing tasks that
rely on the same kernel code-paths (and implicitly the same in-
kernel data-structures) on cores that share a cache domain (e.g. the
L3 cache for an Intel Nehalem microarchitecture). For a mono-
lithic kernel (the only kind we instrument with Fmeter) such an as-
signment boosts performance due to improved cache locality while
executing in kernel-mode [8]. For example, intermittent Fmeter
logging over large time intervals would enable such a cache-aware
task assignment feedback loop; as we show in Section 4.1, Fmeter
signature retrieval and logging is sufficiently inexpensive to render
such logging feasible.
3. EXTRACTING SIGNATURES BY INTER-
CEPTING AND COUNTING KERNEL
FUNCTION CALLS
Instrumenting every existing application to count all possible
function calls is unrealistic. Instead, we only instrument the operat-
ing system kernel, since all applications depend on it to varying de-
grees. User-mode applications typically request services from the
kernel through a well defined application binary interface (ABI).
Fmeter reduces the size of the possible feature-space by limiting its
dimensionality to a subset that is both manageable and contains sig-
nificant low-level information. However, unlike statistical (kernel
and otherwise) profilers, Fmeter triggers upon every kernel func-
tion call. Fmeter keeps track of how many times each kernel func-
tion is called, and exports this information to user-space through
the debugfs [1] file system interface.
Since function names are not sufficient as unambiguous identi-
fiers (e.g. a kernel may have duplicate static functions), we identify
kernel functions by their start address. Absolute addresses work
since unlike relocatable code, the kernel symbols are loaded at the
same address across reboots, however, using addresses means that
the signatures are not valid across different kernel versions. Func-
tion symbols that reside in runtime loadable modules introduce fur-
ther complications since modules are relocated at load time. Ini-
tially Fmeter identified functions in modules using a tuple com-
prising of the module name, version, and function offset within
the module. However, we observed that different version drivers
may contain mostly the same code (confirmed after we compared
disassembled modules one function at a time) but adding even the
slightest modifications at some point in the module changes all sub-
sequent offsets. Therefore we decided that Fmeter does not instru-
ment functions that live within runtime loadable kernel modules,
and signatures will only capture the behavior of modules by virtue
of the calls modules make into the core-kernel. Since Fmeter does
not count the functions that live in modules, it effectively reduces
the dimensionality of the feature space, a technique that is ubiq-
uitously used throughout machine learning (e.g. it is common to
select only the most important features based on principal compo-
nent analysis, and prune out low-impact features).
The Linux kernel already provides several facilities to intercept
and execute ad-hoc handlers when kernel function start or finish ex-
ecuting. For example, the Kernel Dynamic Probes (Kprobes) [30]
subsystem may be used to graft breakpoint instructions at runtime,
and call into implanted handler routines (these routines may live in
runtime loadable modules as well, hence new ones can be coded
as needed). Unlike Kprobes which incur runtime overhead (insert-
ing a breakpoint, executing the handler, single-stepping through the
breakpointed instruction), the Ftrace [2] infrastructure shifts most
of the overhead at kernel compile time an during the kernel boot-up
phase. In particular, when compiled with gcc’s -pg flag, all kernel
functions are injected with a call to a special mcount routine. The
mcount routine must be implemented in assembly because the call
does not follow the conventional C–ABI. During kernel boot-time,
the mcount call sites are iterated over and recorded in a list, and
are subsequently converted into noops. The saved list can later be
used at runtime to dynamically and selectively convert any of the
call-sites back into trace calls.
Currently, Ftrace implements several tracers in this manner, e.g.
a function call tracer to trace all kernel functions, a function graph
tracer that probes functions both upon entry and exit hence provid-
ing the ability to infer call-graphs, a tracer of context switches and
wake-ups between tasks, and so on. Since the Ftrace subsystem
supports a large variety of tracers, it encompasses a general pur-
pose machinery that generically logs retrieved data to user-space
through the debugfs interface. More precisely, Ftrace relies on
large fixed size circular buffers to store traced information, and
individually recorded information has variable size (e.g. function
traces and call-graphs). Moreover, the circular buffer management
is fairly complex since it has to be accessed in an SMP-safe fash-
ion to protect against concurrent updates since the kernel executes
concurrently on all available processors. Although the Ftrace cir-
cular buffer available in the kernel version we started with (version
2.6.28) was deemed to be somewhat lock-heavy [16] with impact
on performance, there have since been various attempts to replace it
with a wait-free alternative [16, 17]. Wait-free FIFO buffers [9, 26]
are difficult to prove correct and are prone to subtle race-conditions
and errors, which is why their adoption into the mainline Linux
kernel has been slow.
Since Ftrace is not extensible in the first place, i.e. new tracers
cannot be added in a non-invasive way, we implemented the Fmeter
tracing to rely only on the mcount kernel functionality and did not
make use of the conventional ring-buffers. Instead, we constructed
an efficient data structure which takes advantage of the structure
of the monitored data to further reduce overheads. Conceptually,
Figure 3: Fmeter runtime kernel function to slot map.
Fmeter requires only a small, fixed size array that maps kernel func-
tion address to an integer value denoting invocation count. Fmeter
creates this mapping at boot-time, right after the kernel introspects
itself and records the mcount sites for all traced kernel functions.
To access and update the mapping during normal operation, we
provide a specialized mcount routine.
The function-to-invocation map is slightly more involved. Fme-
ter actually maintains a set of per-CPU indices, each index mapping
a kernel function to a cache aligned 8 byte integer value. The in-
teger value is incremented each time the corresponding function is
invoked while running on the current CPU. Each per-CPU index is
allocated as a series of free pages, and each page contains an ar-
ray of “slots.” Before a kernel function executes for the first time,
the mcount routine is invoked. Our specialized mcount routine
replaces the call site that triggered its call with a call to a custom-
built stub for the original kernel function whose preamble invoked
mcount in the first place. There will be one such stub dynamically
created by the specialized mcount routine for every instrumented
function. All subsequent calls to the instrumented kernel function
will execute the custom, personalized stub from then on.
The custom stub for each kernel function is generated by em-
bedding two indices into the stub code, as shown in Figure 3. The
first index identifies the page in the page list which constitutes the
per-CPU data buffer. The second index identifies the correspond-
ing slot on the selected page corresponding to the invoked func-
tion. The indices are generated at boot-time, when the mappings
between function addresses and invocation counts are allocated.
When invoked, each individual stub disables preemption to prevent
the current task from being scheduled out and potentially moved
on a different CPU, follows the mapping by way of the two embed-
ded indices, increments the corresponding invocation count, and
re-enables preemption before returning.
Enabling and disabling preemption is a cheap operation that amounts
to incrementing or decrementing an integer value of the current
task’s process control block (namely the ->preempt_count of
current_thread_info()). It is cheaper than atomic oper-
ations like the lock;inc instructions used by the Linux kernel
spinlock primitives and cheaper than compare-and-swap instruc-
tions used for example by wait-free circular buffers. Note that
lock-free constructs do not absolve such atomic operations from
generating expensive cache-coherency traffic over the cross-core
interconnect or across the shared-bus.
The last component is a user-space daemon that periodically reads
the function invocation counts from debugfs and logs them to disk.
The normalizing step during the tf-idf score computation (the
tf in particular) ensures that the collection period does not have
a major influence on the signatures, though it is a configuration
parameter for the daemon. The logging daemon reads all kernel
function invocation counts twice (before and after the time inter-
val) and generates the difference between them. The difference
is later transformed into tf-idf scores, once an entire corpus is
generated.
4. EVALUATION
We begin our evaluation by measuring the overhead introduced
by Fmeter. To quantify the overhead, we perform a set of micro-
and macro-benchmarks. We then proceed to show the efficacy of
statistical data analysis methods. We employ unsupervised (clus-
tering) and supervised (classification) machine learning techniques
to retrieve information and to monitor system behavior.
Throughout our experiments we use a Dell PowerEdge R710
server equipped with a dual socket 2.93GHz Xeon X5570 (Ne-
halem) CPU. Each CPU has four cores and 8MB of shared L3
cache, and is connected through its private on-chip memory con-
troller to 6GB of RAM, for a total of 12 GB of cache-coherent
NUMA system memory. The Nehalem CPUs support hardware
threads, or hyperthreads, hence the operating system manages a to-
tal of 16 processors. The R710 machine is equipped with a Serial
Attached SCSI disk and two Myri-10G NICs, one CX4 10G-PCIE-
8B-C+E NIC and one 10G-PCIE-8B-S+E NIC with a 10G-SFP-
LR transceiver; the server is connected back to back to an identi-
cal twin R710 server (the twin server is only used during experi-
ments involving network traffic). The R710 server runs a vanilla
Linux kernel version 2.6.28 in three configurations: with the Ftrace
subsystem disabled, with the Ftrace function tracer turned on, and
patched with Fmeter instead of Ftrace respectively.
4.1 Micro- and Macro-benchmarks
This section demonstrates the overhead of using Fmeter while
deployed to monitor systems in-production. We compare against
a vanilla kernel with Linux Ftrace function tracer turned both on
and off. When Ftrace is turned off the overhead is zero, whereas
if it is turned on, recording every kernel function call incurs addi-
tional overhead. Kernel functions are behind all system calls which
applications use, they are responsible for handling events, like in-
terrupts, and they are also directly called by kernel threads. Fme-
ter implements its own technique of utilizing the mcount call to
record data in dedicated per-CPU data slots (Figure 3) while incur-
ring low overhead. By contrast, the Ftrace collection mechanism
is more involved, since more information is recorded, e.g. function
call-traces, and passed to user-space.
Table 1 shows the overhead incurred by Ftrace and Fmeter with
respect to a vanilla un-instrumented kernel during the lmbench [43]
micro-benchmark (the results represent average latencies in µs along
with standard error of the mean). Overall, Fmeter incurs signifi-
cantly less overhead than Ftrace. At best, Ftrace is as little as 2.125
times slower than Fmeter, whereas in the worst case Ftrace it is
as high as 8.046 times slower than Fmeter. On average, Fmeter
is 1.4 times slower than a vanilla kernel, whereas Ftrace is about
6.69 times slower than the un-instrumented kernel. It is important
to note that lmbench tests exert unusual stress on very specific ker-
nel operations by executing them in a busy-loop which is uncom-
mon and typically considered an anomaly in real-world production-
ready environments.
Table 2 displays the results of a HTTP server macro-benchmark.
We used the standard apachebench tool, which we configured
to send 512 concurrent connections (1000 times in closed-loop for
Test Baseline Ftrace Fmeter Slowdown
µs µs µs Ftrace Fmeter Ratio
AF_UNIX sock stream latency 4.828±0.585 27.749±2.649 7.393±0.867 5.748 1.531 3.753
Fcntl lock latency 1.219±0.209 6.639±0.039 3.024±0.649 5.446 2.481 2.195
Memory map linux.tar.bz2 206.750±0.590 1800.520±4.486 317.125±1.368 8.709 1.534 5.678
Pagefaults on linux.tar.bz2 0.677±0.008 3.678±0.008 0.866±0.009 5.433 1.279 4.249
Pipe latency 2.492±0.010 12.421±0.042 3.201±0.081 4.985 1.285 3.881
Process fork+/bin/sh -c 1446.800±18.678 6421.000±11.124 1831.590±7.546 4.438 1.266 3.506
Process fork+execve 672.266±6.663 3094.380±14.093 847.289±3.227 4.603 1.260 3.652
Process fork+exit 208.914±6.951 1116.800±10.880 268.275±1.910 5.346 1.284 4.163
Protection fault 0.185±0.009 0.607±0.011 0.286±0.006 3.280 1.544 2.125
Select on 10 fd’s 0.231±0.001 1.410±0.001 0.277±0.001 6.110 1.199 5.096
Select on 10 tcp fd’s 0.261±0.001 1.798±0.004 0.326±0.001 6.897 1.251 5.512
Select on 100 fd’s 0.897±0.002 9.809±0.001 1.321±0.008 10.941 1.474 7.424
Select on 100 tcp fd’s 2.189±0.002 26.616±0.242 3.308±0.023 12.160 1.511 8.046
Semaphore latency 2.890±0.072 6.117±0.236 2.084±0.062 2.117 0.721 2.936
Signal handler installation 0.113±0.000 0.280±0.000 0.127±0.001 2.473 1.119 2.209
Signal handler overhead 0.909±0.010 3.124±0.009 1.072±0.005 3.435 1.179 2.914
Simple fstat 0.100±0.001 0.852±0.006 0.145±0.002 8.550 1.458 5.864
Simple open/close 1.193±0.004 11.222±0.019 1.873±0.014 9.410 1.571 5.991
Simple read 0.101±0.000 1.196±0.007 0.171±0.000 11.893 1.701 6.990
Simple stat 0.721±0.002 7.008±0.021 1.067±0.012 9.720 1.480 6.567
Simple syscall 0.041±0.000 0.210±0.000 0.053±0.000 5.156 1.303 3.958
Simple write 0.086±0.000 1.012±0.004 0.130±0.001 11.723 1.511 7.759
UNIX connection cost 15.328±0.057 81.380±0.260 21.919±1.339 5.309 1.430 3.713
Table 1: LMbench: Linux kernel in vanilla configuration, with Ftrace function tracer on, and with Fmeter on.
Configuration Requests per second Slowdown
vanilla 14215.2±69.6931 0.00 %
fmeter 10793.3±77.7275 24.07 %
ftrace 5524.93±33.4601 61.13 %
Table 2: apachebench results for the Linux kernel in vanilla
(un-instrumented) configuration, with the standard Ftrace ker-
nel function tracer on, and with Fmeter on.
Unmodified Ftrace Fmeter
real 57m8.961s 89m56.821s 56m43.264s
user 47m50.175s 49m5.492s 46m24.890s
sys 7m59.642s 41m31.300s 9m45.817s
Table 3: Linux kernel compile elapsed time.
a total of 512000 requests) and we used a single 1400 byte HTML
file as the target served by the apache httpd web server. We ran the
apachebench client on the same machine as the apache HTTP
server to eliminate any network-induced artifacts. All tests were
conducted 16 times for each configuration, and we report the aver-
age along with the standard error of the mean. The Table shows a
24% slowdown in the number of requests completed per second for
Fmeter and a 61% slowdown for Ftrace. As with lmbench, the test
stresses the system to magnify overheads by issuing a large number
of concurrent connections.
Finally, Table 3 depicts the time elapsed while compiling the
Linux kernel, as reported by the time utility (not the bash time
command), atop various configurations. As expected, the time spent
in user-mode (under the row labeled user) is roughly the same ir-
respective if a vanilla kernel is used, or whether one of the Ftrace
function tracer or the Fmeter subsystems are enabled instead. How-
ever, unlike user-mode code which is not instrumented, the kernel
code is, and the numbers shown in the Table (under the row labeled
sys) reveal that while Fmeter slows down the kernel compilation
by about 22%, Ftrace slows it down by no less than 420%, i.e. it is
5.2 times slower. The numbers are consistent with the Fmeter and
Ftrace design which only rely on the instrumentation of the kernel
code-paths. In general, applications that rely little on the operat-
ing system’s kernel functionality, e.g. those applications that issue
few system calls (like the scientific programs that crunch numbers),
would show a lower overhead. However it also implies that there
are less opportunities for meaningful system signatures to be col-
lected by Fmeter when such applications are running, thereby re-
ducing the efficacy of our system profiling methodology altogether.
4.2 Statistical Data Analysis: Clustering and
Supervised Machine Learning
Next we show the amenability of signatures retrieved with Fme-
ter towards statistical data analysis techniques. We extract the sig-
natures while performing workloads in a controlled environment.
First, we show that supervised machine learning can be applied
to distinguish with high accuracy amongst the signatures extracted
while performing three different workloads. Second, we evaluate
the efficacy of the same machine learning classifiers in distinguish-
ing between highly similar behaviors, as induced by subtle mod-
ifications in the code of a network interface device driver. The
device driver resides in an un-instrumented kernel module, hence
the signatures retrieved only account for the core-kernel functions
the driver calls into (i.e. none of the functions of either driver are
instrumented). Our assumption is that such subtle device driver
modifications are characteristic of compromised or buggy systems
which are otherwise exceedingly hard to forensically analyze.
And third, we show that signatures retrieved during the same
workloads can be automatically clustered together and accurately
distinguished from signatures belonging to different workloads. We
employ the same set of signatures used to previously evaluate the
supervised machine learning. Since clustering is an unsupervised
learning method, system operators may rely on it to identify spe-
cific behaviors without having access to labeled signatures. Op-
erators may categorize whether a particular behavior of interest is
similar to a previously observed syndrome by comparing the be-
havior’s signatures with syndrome signatures.
Throughout the evaluation we employ conventional, though state-
of-the-art, machine learning algorithms and information retrieval
measurement techniques.
4.2.1 Supervised Machine Learning
We begin by showing how supervised machine learning can dis-
tinguish with high accuracy between Fmeter signatures correspond-
ing to different system behaviors. We then proceed to evaluate the
efficacy of machine learning classifiers in distinguishing between
highly similar system behaviors—as induced by subtle modifica-
tions in the code of a network interface controller’s device driver
which resides in an un-instrumented kernel module. For the former
experiment, we collected a set of signatures from three different
tasks in a controlled fashion. The tasks in question were:
• kernel compile (kcompile)
• secure copy of files over the network (scp)
• dbench disk throughput benchmark (dbench)
All three tasks ran on the same system—our Dell PowerEdge
R710 server—without interference from each-other. The Fmeter
logging daemon collected the signatures every 10 seconds. For
every workload type we retrieved roughly 250 distinct signatures,
which we subjected to our machine learning methods.
There are many available types of supervised classifiers one can
use, like decision trees, Neural Networks, perceptrons, Support
Vector Machines (SVMs), Gaussian mixture models, and naïve Bayes,
not to mention ensemble techniques that combine one or more clas-
sifiers of the same (e.g. bagging and boosting of decision trees) or
different type to perform classification. Based on our previous ex-
perience, we chose to use the SV Mlight [24, 25] classifier, which is
an implementation of Vapnik’s Support Vector Machine [46]. We
are also in the process of experimenting with a hand-crafted C4.5
decision tree package that supports high dimension vectors and is
capable of performing boosting and bagging.
In a nutshell, SVMs construct a hyperplane that separates the
vectors in the training set such that the separation margin is max-
imized (i.e. the hyperplane is chosen such that it has the largest
distance to the nearest training data points of any class). Since the
vectors in the training example may not be linearly separable by a
hyperplane in the vector-space defined by the features, SVMs rely
on kernel-functions (not to be confused with the operating system’s
in-kernel functions traced by Fmeter) to construct the hyperplane in
a higher dimensional space. Classifying is performed in a straight-
forward manner, simply by determining on which “side” of the hy-
perplane an example point/vector resides.
A common practice for evaluating the performance of a machine
learning algorithm when one does not have a large data set is to use
a technique called K-fold cross validation. As we only collected
signatures for 30 or 60 minutes every 10 seconds, we did not create
a large data set, therefore we performed K-fold cross validation in
the following fashion. We split the positive and negative signatures
into K sets of equal (modulo K) sizes. We merge the positive signa-
tures of set i with the negative signatures of set i, ∀i ∈ {0,K−1},
thus creating K folds. For each fold i, we set it aside and mark
it as the test data. Fold ((i+ 1) mod K) is marked as the valida-
tion data, and the remaining folds are concatenated together and
marked as the training data. Then we proceed to repeatedly train
the SV Mlight classifier on the training data while using the valida-
tion data to incrementally tune the parameters of the classifier, if
any. Once the classifier parameters are chosen based on the per-
formance on the validation data (e.g. choosing the parameters that
maximize accuracy), the classifier is evaluated a single time on the
test data. (Note that to ensure correctness, the test set should be
used only once, to assess the performance of a fully trained clas-
sifier.) We report the average metrics obtained by evaluating the
classifier on the test data for each of the K folds—without further
training the model.
For neither of the experiments we report on did we spend signifi-
cant time searching the parameter space. Instead, we simply set the
SVM’s kernel parameter to the default polynomial function, and
we searched the parameter space of the trade-off between training
error and margin, also known as the C parameter. Note that the sig-
nature vectors were scaled into the unit-ball using the L2 norm—a
common SVM classification practice.
We begin by evaluating the performance of the SVM classifier
while distinguishing between the same three distinct workloads.
Our classifier expects only two distinct classes labeled +1 and −1
respectively, therefore, since we have a total of three workloads we
perform the following experiments. First, we apply the SVM clas-
sifier to datasets containing signatures from all possible combina-
tions of two distinct classes, which yields the following groupings:
scp (+1) vs. kcompile (−1), scp (+1) vs. dbench (−1), and
kcompile (+1) vs. dbench (−1). Next, we apply the SVM
classifier to groupings in which we label the signatures from one of
the workloads to be of class +1 and the remaining signatures from
the other two workloads to be of class −1. We repeat the group-
ings for every workload, yielding three possible combinations (e.g.
the first one being scp of class +1 and kcompile ∪ dbench of
class −1).
Table 4 depicts the SVM performance in terms of accuracy, pre-
cision, and recall on the test set, averaged over all 10-folds. The
SVM has been previously calibrated on the validation set. We also
report the accuracy baseline, which is computed by reporting on the
accuracy of a pseudo-classifier that always chooses the class with
the label of the majority signatures. For example, if a dataset con-
tains 100 data points of class +1 and 150 data points of class −1,
then the baseline accuracy would be 150250 = 0.6 (or 60%). Table 4
shows the SVM classifier to perform remarkably well. In particular,
it is able to perfectly distinguish the workloads in three of the sig-
nature groupings, and performs almost as good for the remaining
groupings. (To get a better intuition of the classifier’s performance
it is important to compare the reported accuracy with the baseline
accuracy.)
Next, we evaluate how well can machine learning tell apart sig-
natures generated by systems that only differ in subtle ways. For
this experiment, the core kernel remains the same, and we only al-
ter the myri10ge device driver for the Myri10G NIC. Further, the
device driver resides in a runtime loadable module, which Fmeter
does not instrument, therefore the possible set of kernel functions
that are being counted by Fmeter does not change. Instead, Fmeter
records the signatures that contain the driver’s behavior by virtue
of the core-kernel symbols (i.e. functions) the driver calls into.
We chose the following three scenarios for the monitored sys-
tem: (i) running with the myri10ge driver version 1.5.1 and default
load-time parameters, (ii) running with the myri10ge driver version
1.4.3 and default load-time parameters, and (iii) running with the
myri10ge driver version 1.5.1 but with the load-time parameter set
to disable the large receive offload (LRO) capability. The first sce-
nario provides a baseline for “normal” mode of operation, while
the second and third scenarios provide various degrees of diverging
modes of operation. For example, the scenario in which the LRO is
disabled may correspond to a compromised system that maliciously
loaded a runtime module/extension which increases the propensity
of the machine to DDOS attacks. Likewise, the scenario in which
we use an older version of the driver may be indicative of a buggy or
a compromised vital subsystem. As a matter of fact, we disassem-
Signature grouping Baseline Test set (average± standard deviation, over all folds)
Accuracy (%) Accuracy (%) Precision (%) Recall (%)
dbench(+1), kcompile(−1) 51.797 100.00±0.00 100.00±0.00 100.00±0.00
scp(+1), kcompile(−1) 51.177 99.39±0.99 99.28±1.54 99.56±1.38
scp(+1), dbench(−1) 50.619 100.00±0.00 100.00±0.00 100.00±0.00
dbench(+1), kcompile ∪ scp (−1) 65.589 100.00±0.00 100.00±0.00 100.00±0.00
scp (+1), kcompile ∪ dbench (−1) 66.432 99.57±0.69 99.17±1.76 99.56±1.38
kcompile (+1), scp ∪ dbench (−1) 67.977 99.57±0.69 99.56±1.38 99.09±1.92
Table 4: SV Mlight performance on clustering workloads: averaged accuracy, precision, and recall over all 10-folds.
Signature comparison Baseline Test set (average± standard deviation, over all folds)
Accuracy (%) Accuracy (%) Precision (%) Recall (%)
myri10ge 1.4.3 (+1), 1.5.1(−1) 50.765 100.00±0.00 100.00±0.00 100.00±0.00
myri10ge 1.5.1 (+1), 1.5.1 LRO disabled(−1) 50.25 100.00±0.00 100.00±0.00 100.00±0.00
myri10ge 1.4.3 (+1), 1.5.1 LRO disabled(−1) 51.015 100.00±0.00 100.00±0.00 100.00±0.00
Table 5: SV Mlight reported performance on myri10ge: averaged accuracy, precision, and recall over all 8-folds.
bled the two driver versions (with objdump) and compared the un-
relocated binary representation of the functions code. With respect
to the older version of the driver, 24 functions were altered in the
newer version, one function (myri10ge_get_frag_header)
was removed, and 11 new functions were added. Of the newly
added functions, only one was ever called during our workloads,
namely myri10ge_select_queue. (Recall that none of these
functions, or any other functions defined within the loadable drivers
for that matter, belong to the Fmeter vector space.)
We ran Netperf [32] TCP stream tests between the two twin
servers with the receiver machine running the Fmeter instrumented
kernel and the three myri10ge driver variants. During the Netperf
runs, we were able to achieve 10Gbps line rate. By contrast, if
the conventional Ftrace kernel function tracer is on, we were able
to only achieve a throughput of little more than half the line rate,
which indicates that the overall overhead introduced by Fmeter was
acceptable. Table 5 shows the results of the SVM classifier on
all folds of the test set (we used eight-fold cross validation), after
the C parameter was calibrated on the validation set. Our classi-
fier achieves achieve perfect accuracy, prediction, and recall in all
cases. (The case in which we compared the version 1.4.3 of the
driver against version 1.5.1 with LRO disabled was supposed to be
a baseline indicator that is easier to classify than the other two.)
4.2.2 Signature Clustering
Next we test how well the Fmeter signatures behave when sub-
jected to an unsupervised learning method such as clustering. We
use the same three workloads we already evaluated our supervised
machine learning against in Section 4.2.1, namely scp, kcompile
and dbench. This choice of workload also allows us to directly
compare how the unsupervised clustering stacks against the super-
vised machine learning.
We implemented two standard well-known clustering algorithms,
namely agglomerative hierarchical clustering, and K-means respec-
tively. Both clustering algorithms use the Euclidean distance (as in-
duced by the L2 norm), while the agglomerative hierarchical clus-
tering is of the complete-, single-, and average-linkage flavors. We
only report on the single-linkage variant throughout the paper since
the results for complete- and average-linkage are similar.
Figure 4 shows a visual representation of the agglomerative single-
linkage hierarchical clustering algorithm over 20 randomly chosen
signatures belonging to two distinct classes. Signatures 0 through
9 were sampled (without replacement) from the signatures retrieved
while performing the scpworkload, whereas signatures 10 through
19 were sampled from the signatures collected while performing
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Figure 5: K-means cluster purity (probability) given the num-
ber of (equally) sampled vectors from each class.
the kcompile workload. As you can see, the Figure shows a per-
fect separation at the level immediately below the aggregation tree
root—which is the ideal scenario for two distinct classes.
Although the hierarchical clustering algorithm is more precise
than the K-means algorithm, it is computationally more expensive,
and it requires a notoriously hard to choose “height-cut” for auto-
matic evaluation given more than two distinct classes. By contrast,
the K-means algorithm converges significantly faster, and since the
target number of resulting/expected clusters (i.e. the K parameter)
is already given as an input parameter, it is straightforward to auto-
matically evaluate the quality of the clustering result. (Although the
ability to choose the number of resulting clusters is the greatest ad-
vantage of the K-means algorithm, it is also its greatest drawback.)
We chose to use the K-means algorithm as our primary clustering
unsupervised learning mechanism.
There are various metrics for evaluating the quality of clustering,
like purity, normalized mutual information, Rand index, or the F-
measure. For our evaluation we chose to use purity, since it is both
simple and transparent. In particular, to compute the purity of a
clustering, each resulting cluster is assigned to its most frequent
class, and the accuracy of the assignment is measured by counting
the number of correctly assigned signatures divided by the total
number of signatures.
Figure 5 shows the cluster purity between all four permutations
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Figure 4: Hierarchical single-linkage clustering of 20 randomly chosen signatures. Signatures 0 through 9 are retrieved while
performing the scp workload, signatures 10 through 19 while performing the kcompile workload.
of the three workloads on the y-axis. We used the K-means algo-
rithm, with the K parameter set for the actual number of clusters,
i.e. K = 3 for the clustering of scp, kcompile, and dbench,
and K = 2 otherwise. On the x-axis, the Figure depicts the num-
ber of signatures randomly selected, without replacement, from
each workload class (the same number of signatures were selected
from the kcompile workload as were selected from the scp, and
dbench workloads). The results are averaged over 12 runs, with
the error bars denoting standard error of the mean. There are three
observations. First, the purity scores are high, denoting high qual-
ity clustering results. Second, the clustering performance increases
only slightly as the number of signatures increases, which means
that a small number of signatures are sufficient to properly deter-
mine each cluster’s centroid. And third, the quality of the clusters
for K = 3 and vectors sampled from each of the workloads avail-
able is lower than the quality of clusters yielded by K-means with
K = 2 and vectors sampled only from two separate workloads, ir-
respective of which two workloads were sampled. This means that
clustering effectiveness appears to decrease as more classes (corre-
sponding to different workloads) are considered.
At this point it is important to note that high purity is easy to
achieve by simply increasing the number of expected clusters; in
the case of K-means by increasing the value of the parameter K. In
particular, if there are as many clusters as there are vectors (signa-
tures), then the purity evaluates to 1.0. We proceed to leverage
this property to show the quality of the clustering results. Fig-
ure 6 shows the purity of clustering signatures from the scp and
dbench workloads, by increasing the number of target / expected
clusters (we simply varied the parameter K of the K-means algo-
rithm). As the Figure shows, the purity scores converge rapidly to
the maximum value of 1.0 while the standard error of the mean de-
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Figure 6: K-means cluster purity for scp and dbench signa-
tures with respect to different number of target clusters (the K
parameter). There are two original classes.
creases at the same time. The intuition is that there are very few (1,
2, or 3) additional clusters that capture the clustering “mistakes”
made by the ideal clustering (where K is set to the actual number
of classes, K = 2 in this case). The additional separate clusters will
group together these incorrectly classified signatures.
Compared to supervised machine learning, clustering on the same
sets of signatures performs worse. Nevertheless, clustering is still
a useful statistical analysis method, since it can naturally group
signatures belonging to many classes. Furthermore, we can ap-
ply meta-clustering on the retrieved cluster centroids to determine
which classes of behaviors, and hence not just individual signa-
tures which are instances of behaviors, are closer to one another.
Determining which system behaviors are similar to one-another in
the way they use the operating system kernel functions can then be
leveraged for low-level optimizations (e.g. improve cache locality).
The take-away is that Fmeter generates low-overhead signatures
that by construction are amenable for statistical manipulation through
formal methods like supervised and unsupervised machine learn-
ing, like support vector machines, and clustering. Further, we have
shown throughout the evaluation that such machine learning meth-
ods can be applied with great success to automatically infer low-
level system behavior.
5. LIMITATIONS
Fmeter uses the Ftrace infrastructure, as such, it only traces ker-
nel function calls. We recognize that the kernel makes extensive
use of function inlining and pre-processor macros (e.g. common
list, hash-table, and even page table traversals) which we are un-
able to capture with our current methodology. Likewise, processes
that require very little kernel intervention, like scientific applica-
tions, are likely to be all assigned similar signatures that are very
close to the null/zero vector, which makes them harder to distin-
guish from one another, irrespective if unsupervised or supervised
learning machinery is used.
Moreover, we recognize that the process of performing a mea-
surement introduces uncertainty itself by interfering with the col-
lected data. For example, the user-space daemon that logs signa-
tures to disk interferes with the monitored system by virtue of us-
ing the kernel’s pseudo file system and the kernel’s proper file and
storage subsystem (buffer cache, VFS, ext3, block layer, and so
on). However, all retrieved signatures are perturbed uniformly by
the logging which proceeds regardless, and the inverse document
frequency of the tf-idf scores works in our favor by naturally
attenuating the effect of such measurement interference.
Fmeter indexing only stores kernel function call counts, ignoring
many other system parameters. For optimal usage of our monitor-
ing technique, tools which may use Fmeter can either monitor other
high-level system parameters themselves or use existing monitor-
ing tools in conjunction with Fmeter. In other words, our technique
provides a means to perform statistical inference based on low-
level system signatures, like searching past occurrences within a
system’s history based on similarity. Note that a single index may
correspond to many system events of interest or such events may
span over many indices. Moreover, the granularity of indices de-
pends upon the monitoring interval—currently, our user-space log-
ging daemon retrieves signatures every 2-10 seconds. (The term-
frequency factor of the tf-idf score is normalized to prevent
bias towards longer runs, which means that signatures do not miss
events that occur for brief periods of time.)
6. FUTURE WORK
Currently, the overhead introduced by Fmeter is much higher
than the overhead of statistical profiling tools like oprofile. Nev-
ertheless, the Fmeter overhead is also significantly lower than that
of the precise profiling tools like the ones relying on the conven-
tional Ftrace kernel function tracer. Since the kernel function invo-
cations follow a power-law distribution (see Figure 1), a straight-
forward optimization to the Fmeter counting infrastructure would
be to maintain a fast cache that holds the call counts for the top
N hottest functions. Using a sufficiently small cache to account
for the most popular kernel functions could lower the overheads,
e.g. by decreasing the cache pollution incurred while following the
Fmeter stubs. The value of N can be experimentally chosen based
on the size of the processor caches.
We also plan to explore using Fmeter signatures to perform meta-
clustering on already retrieved cluster centroids. Being able to ap-
ply clustering methods in such a recursive fashion would allow us
to determine which entire classes, not just instances of behavior,
are similar in the way they invoke the kernel functionality. We can
thus leverage this information to better schedule concurrently exe-
cuting tasks that rely on the same kernel code-paths (and implicitly
the same in-kernel data-structures) on processor cores that share a
cache domain (e.g. the L3 cache for an Intel Nehalem microarchi-
tecture). Such assignments have the potential to boost the overall
performance of monolithic kernels due to improved cache locality
while executing in kernel-mode.
7. RELATED WORK
We review the spectrum of existing system monitoring tools in
terms of their functionality and scope. System monitoring tools
vary and are often built from performance counters, logging, in-
dexable signatures and retrieval methods, as well as approaches that
combine these methods.
7.1 System Monitoring using Performance
Counters
The most commonly used monitoring tools record system vari-
ables for performance tuning and failure diagnostics. Oprofile [3]
and DCPI [4] use hardware performance counters, and ProfileMe
[14] uses instruction-level counters to periodically collect long-
term system usage information. Such powerful post-processing
utilities aid in visualizing and identifying potential performance
bottlenecks. With such statistics, it is possible, for example, to un-
derstand and analyze the behavior of Java applications [44]. Since
these tools focus on a small and limited set of predefined perfor-
mance counters, it becomes impossible to look up arbitrary system
behavior of interest in the logs. Fmeter differs from these tools by
allowing execution sequences (low-level system signatures) to be
indexed and later retrieved.
Chopstix [5] expands the use of individual counters by monitor-
ing a diverse set of system information. These “vital signs” pro-
vide a wider picture of system execution at a given point in time.
Along the same lines are tools such as CyDAT, Ganglia, CoMoN
and Artemis [15, 29, 33, 12] which focus on monitoring distributed
systems and cater to the fast growing cloud computing environ-
ments. The visualization methods for such tools are important for
understanding interactions amongst the nodes in a cluster due to the
large volumes of logs and heterogeneity in platforms.
7.2 System Monitoring Based on Logging
System logging is used in another area of system monitoring.
System operators, developers and automatic trainers can extract er-
ror conditions in the logs and use machine learning techniques to
predict indicated errors [37, 39, 18, 22]. Alternatively, system state
signatures can be recorded and searched for automatic diagnosis
[35]. There is also a dedicated set of tracers which allows isolating
non-deterministic system behavior and heisenbugs [31, 36] and re-
playing execution from the logs [21] to reproduce error conditions
or perform fault correction on the fly [45, 34]. In addition, statisti-
cal induction techniques exist for automated performance diagnosis
and management at the server application level [10]. Fmeter differs
from these tools since it is able to generate indexable signatures in
a running system with minimal overhead (see Section 4.2.1).
7.3 System Monitoring Based on Indexable
Signatures
Recent work [11] has shown how indexable signatures can be
used to capture essential system characteristics in a form that facil-
itates automated clustering and similarity based retrieval. K-means
clustering and L2 norm are then used to compare similarities among
system states. Our work uses the statistical vector space model [38]
to represent the system execution in a given time frame. Fmeter
demonstrates how indexable signatures in low-level system moni-
toring (kernel function calls) can be generated with minimum over-
head and used in a running high performance system. We also use
an existing information retrieval technique to facilitate manipula-
tion of Fmeter’s logs for application of clustering algorithms and
other optimizations.
7.4 System Monitoring Based on Indexing
Logs
Signature based system monitoring has also inspired methodolo-
gies which focus on post-processing of logs to generate useful in-
ferences. This class of methods attempts to generate inferences
based either on identifying some signatures in the log data or find-
ing anomaly-based aberrations [42, 19]. One such approach fo-
cuses on system call monitoring to catch anomalies at runtime [41].
Our method is a generalization of such analysis which can be used
for both signature-based retrieval and anomaly detection. Alterna-
tively, use of fine-grained control flow graphs as signatures has also
been proposed as a useful malware detection strategy [6]. More-
over, similarity based measures working at the application level on
a diverse set of system attributes have shown to be successful [27].
Latest work shows a novel path of combining source code analysis
and runtime feature creation into console log mining for anomaly
detection [47, 28]. Our approach explores a similar way of apply-
ing machine learning and information retrieval techniques.
8. CONCLUSION
We present Fmeter, a monitoring infrastructure that extracts for-
mal, indexable, low-level system signatures by embedding kernel
function calls into the classical vector space model. Fmeter repre-
sents system signatures as tf-idf weight vectors by disregarding
the semantic information in a document and consider only the sta-
tistical properties of the terms belonging to the document (and to
the corpus). In our case, we disregard the sequence of kernel func-
tion calls (the “call stack” trace), the function parameters, memory
location accesses, hardware device state manipulation and so on.
Instead, we rely on as little information as possible, namely count-
ing the kernel function calls. This approach is sufficient to provide
meaningful and effective system signatures, while incurring low
system overhead. Further, the signatures are naturally amenable
for statistical information retrieval manipulations, like clustering,
machine learning, and information retrieval. We demonstrate the
efficacy of Fmeter by yielding near-perfect results during cluster-
ing and supervised classification of various system behaviors.
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